

THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

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THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1992

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have before us today Hon. Robert M. Gates, who serves as our Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Director, I think this is your first appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee since you have taken on your responsibilities.

Welcome to the committee. We look forward to a close association with you over a period of time.

I am substituting this morning for the chairman, Chairman Fасcell, who may be here later, but is not able to be here at this time, and he expresses his regrets to you for not being able to be present.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Fасcell follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANTE B. FASCELL

We are pleased to have before us today, the Honorable Robert M. Gates who serves as our Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Director, it is a pleasure to have you here. In the last 2 years, we have witnessed monumental changes throughout the global community. We have seen:

The fall of the Berlin Wall and with it the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Communist empire;

The expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait by the U.S.-led international coalition;

The failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union which brought about the peaceful transition of power from Mr. Gorbachev to Mr. Yeltsin and with the transition the subsequent creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States; and other encouraging events including:

The historic first meeting between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors including the Palestinians to begin at long last, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the breaking out of peace agreements in El Salvador and Cambodia, and perhaps even on the Korean peninsula.

The American people welcome these positive events and changes. At the same time, it would seem equally obvious that these positive events and changes will alter the way in which the CIA conducts itself in collecting intelligence and in providing the President with its guidance through its intelligence assessments. Clearly, it would seem reasonable to assume that our Nation's intelligence priorities have also been changed as a result of these events. It would also seem reasonable to assume that our intelligence priorities may also have become moving targets, rather than the traditional targets of the Cold War era.

Nevertheless, the world remains a dangerous place. Clearly, the CIA continues to play a pivotal role in determining just what threats confront the United States and the international community as a whole. Just as the United States must continue to be engaged so as to lead in making sure that the world becomes a safer and more secure place in which to live, the CIA must continue to provide assessments with regard to the threats that confront American leadership in this effort.

For the last 40-plus years, U.S. foreign policies have been predicated upon the theologies of the Cold War. Now that that struggle is over, we are confronted with a world of both promise and peril. The promise rests upon a foundation that can be structured upon the growing emergence of democracy throughout the world, international cooperation in solving the problems of the world and fundamental respect of human rights throughout the world.

The peril rests on the ruins of the Cold War foundation in which Iraq became the world's fourth largest military power with previously unknown or unestimated capabilities in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons technologies. The peril rests upon the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means through which to deliver those weapons throughout the global community. The peril rests upon the rise of nationalist forces throughout the world. The peril remains so long as there is brutal repression of the people and disrespect for human rights in the People's Republic of China, North Korea and Cuba.

With those thoughts in mind, we are looking forward to hearing your views on the new role of the intelligence community in the post-Cold War era, as we move hopefully from a world of peril to a world of promise in the twenty-first century.

Mr. HAMILTON. Obviously we have witnessed monumental changes throughout the world and we look forward to your statement today and hearing your views on the role of the intelligence community in this post-Cold War era as we move hopefully toward a world of promise in the 21st century.

Before you proceed, Mr. Gilman has a statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to join you this morning in welcoming before us Director Robert Gates of the CIA. We know that Bob Gates has an excellent background in intelligence, having joined the Agency in 1966. He came up through the analysis side of the Agency and served under three Presidents, two of them Republican, on the staff of the National Security Council.

Not only does Mr. Gates enjoy a reputation for providing high-quality intelligence, he has also shown himself worthy of great confidence. The President displayed this confidence by choosing him first as Deputy National Security Adviser and now as Director of CIA.

Mr. Gates, I am sure you will agree that despite the end of the Cold War, the challenges for our intelligence community have never been greater. We look forward to your testimony and the great changes in the world and what you are doing to make certain we retain our ability to monitor them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broomfield follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

Thank you, Mr. Chairman:

I wish to join with you this morning in welcoming before us the Honorable Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence.

We all know that Bob Gates has an excellent background in intelligence, having joined the CIA in 1966. He came up through the analysis side of the Agency, and also served under three Presidents—two of them Republican—on the staff of the National Security Council.

Not only does Mr. Gates enjoy a reputation for providing high-quality intelligence, he has also shown himself worthy of great confidence. The President displayed this

confidence by choosing him first as Deputy National Security Advisor, and now Director of Central Intelligence.

Bob, I'm sure you'll agree that, despite the end of the Cold War, the challenges for the intelligence community have never been greater. I look forward to your testimony on all the great changes in the world, and what you're doing to make sure we retain our ability to monitor them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gates.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to discuss some of the foreign issues relating to our national security and other national interests.

I will look first at developments in Russia and the other Soviet successor states. I will then turn to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Then I will mention developments in regions where we have vital interests; and finally I will talk about other issues and areas where our Government, and consequently the intelligence community, is deeply engaged.

First, the Soviet successor states.

The reforms in the successor states face rough sledding. Though Russian President Yeltsin still enjoys considerable popular support, opposition is mounting to the pace and scope of the economic reform program. Russian Vice President Rutskoy has called the program a prescription for disaster and urged the imposition of an emergency regime.

The freeing of prices earlier this year resulted in modest boosts in the availability of goods, but scarcities remain widespread and many items are now beyond the reach of those with diminishing incomes.

Only minor progress has been achieved so far toward privatization. Economic reformers in Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics confront resistance from local leaders, many of them holdovers from the old regime, who oppose economic and political reform.

Despite these troubling signs, the Russian leadership appears committed to staying the course. The Yeltsin government has raised wages, pensions, and some social welfare spending in an effort to blunt domestic criticism, but so far it has not compromised on his basic program.

Signs in the other former Soviet republics of a commitment to reforms are encouraging. As in Russia, however, those efforts must overcome the challenge of an increasingly vocal, and hostile, opposition to marketization and democratization.

Members of the Commonwealth differ strongly about its role. All believe the CIS should continue the strategic nuclear weapons, but beyond that, there appears to be little agreement.

The Russian leadership has argued that the Commonwealth should have a broad role in coordinating economic, military, and foreign policy.

Other republics, particularly Ukraine, think the only CIS role should be to control the strategic nuclear forces.

Most of the republics, wary that Russia will dominate the CIS, are pursuing bilateral ties with other states. But we think the suc-

cessor states will find they need the CIS, or some alternative multilateral mechanism—to coordinate mutual economic activity.

We see the potential for conflict rising. Despite some long-standing ethnic animosities and the rapidity of political and economic change, there has been relatively little ethnic conflict during the past few months. The rising level of violence in the Transcaucasus, however, is just one indication of the many simmering ethnic tensions that pose a long-term threat to the stability of the former Soviet republics.

The continuing dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet and the nature of the Commonwealth is just one indicator that the road to establishing stable, cooperative inter-republic relations will be difficult. Although republic leaders recognize the need to cooperate, they continue to have fundamental differences over the sharing of power and resources.

Furthermore, even if the leaders are willing to compromise, now that the coercive restraints on their conduct have been swept away, many citizens of the new states are venting long-suppressed ethnic animosities; they are not yet ready to embrace ethnic harmony, even if it is in their economic self-interest.

All the successor states want good relations with the United States. Consequently, they have assured us of their commitment to economic and political reform, continued adherence to international agreements—particularly arms control agreements, and observance of human rights. Several areas of concern remain, however. The members of the Commonwealth have not yet resolved all matters regarding ratification and implementation of arms control agreements. I will say more about this in a moment. They also continue to disagree over how to divide up the debt of the former U.S.S.R.

With respect to military developments, the strategic forces are still formidable, but we foresee a reduction in strategic forces to well below START levels and major alterations in military doctrine, force goals, weapons requirements, and operations.

President Yeltsin has proposed an arms control agenda that includes a reduction to 2,000–2,500 strategic warheads, less than half the level permitted by START.

Conscription shortfalls are beginning to affect even the strategic forces. Some units of the elite Strategic Rocket Forces are, by their own admission, at least 50 percent under strength. The submarine force is experiencing training deficiencies and an outflow of junior officers.

Operational deployments of many elements of the strategic forces appear to have declined.

SS-18 ICBMs continue to be produced in Ukraine and deployed in Russia and Kazakhstan. Production may cease after the current run; Ukrainian officials claim there are no new production orders.

As of earlier this month, road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs continued to be produced in Russia. Some were deployed in Russia and Byelarus as late as last December.

In addition, several new strategic ballistic missiles are still in development.

The general purpose forces are fragmenting. They are at their lowest readiness level in decades.

These forces are being subjected to enormous material, psychological and political pressures as the new republics reform their economic and political systems and sort out their interrelationships. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova reject the idea of the CIS controlling the majority of the general purpose forces; they intend to form independent national forces from former Soviet units and equipment based on their territories.

At the recent meeting of the CIS heads of State in Minsk, Byelorussia reiterated its intention to have its own army, but agreed to participate in a joint CIS force for a transitional period.

Complicating the relationship is the distribution of the former Soviet military units, equipment, and infrastructure in Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia. As a result of Soviet military deployments during the Cold War, Ukraine and Byelorussia now have what Russian leaders regard as a disproportionately large share of these assets. They believe that Russia's larger size and greater global status justify giving it more of these assets than the leaders of the other republics are prepared to give up.

The former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons are being consolidated into Russia. Many of the tactical nuclear weapons have already been transferred there; by the late 1990's, all of the remaining strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in Russia as well. Currently, several thousand nuclear weapons are still located at well secured installations in other republics.

But we face a period of uncertainty as Russia and the other nuclear republics sort out possession of the weapons and establish new structures and procedures for controlling and operating them. For now, Yeltsin and the General Staff retain control over all nuclear weapons through an elaborate and effective system of safeguards operated in the name of the CIS by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

But the military is being subjected to unprecedented stresses that the control system was not designed to absorb. The responsible personnel have many of the same economic problems and nationalist aspirations as their civilian countrymen.

Dismantling nuclear weapons will be difficult and costly and will take many years. There are several facilities capable of this task, all located in Russia. We are working with the Russians on ways to expedite the elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, even a diminishing strategic arsenal will still be capable of devastating the United States or other countries. Therefore, as long as there is any possibility that turmoil in the region could stimulate the emergence of a new, hostile regime, the remaining strategic weapons will constitute a danger to us.

At the same time, defense spending in the Soviet Union or in the CIS is plummeting. For the first quarter of this year, Russia's defense budget amounts to about 50 billion rubles. Annualized and adjusted for inflation, it would be about a third as large as last year's official defense budget for the entire Soviet Union. If the other CIS members contributed proportional shares, which we think unlikely, the total would be about half of Soviet defense spending last year. At Yeltsin's behest, parliament has cut military procurement spending in the first quarter by about 85 percent.

Although work continues at defense plants and R&D organizations, many defense enterprises have experienced funding shortfalls since last autumn, when republics stopped contributing to the union budget. They have also had to cope with loss of priority status, supply disruptions, and rising prices for raw materials and components. Enterprises have been trying to compensate by introducing or increasing output of nonmilitary goods, but most are having little success, leading them to look to arms exports as a source of needed revenue.

Prospects for the implementation of the START Treaty appear to us to be reasonably good given Russia's leadership and control of the strategic nuclear forces. The Governments of Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan have declared their intent to abide by the START Treaty. Officials of the new states support the Treaty, because it provides a mechanism to ensure that reductions in strategic weaponry are accomplished in a prescribed manner and time-frame.

We anticipate some failures to meet Treaty deadlines and confusion over locational restrictions, required notifications, and inspection procedures. But these difficulties will be an outgrowth of the unsettled conditions in the new countries, in our judgment, rather than calculated efforts to evade provisions of the Treaty.

The detailed inspection procedures were designed to inhibit cheating, but that will be less of a concern than anticipated, at least for the next several years. The successor states lack both the motive and the economic wherewithal to engage in militarily significant cheating; moreover, because of their greater openness compared with the former Soviet Union, cheating would be much harder to conceal.

Ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty face greater hurdles. Even though the successor states have declared their intention to abide by the Treaty's terms, they disagree on how to divide up the equipment allocated to the former Soviet Union under the CFE Treaty. They are under pressure to resolve the outstanding issues by July, when the CSCE summit is scheduled.

Implementing the CFE verification procedures, such as information exchanges and on-site inspections, will be complicated by the need to deal with eight states rather than one. As with the START Treaty, the likelihood that militarily significant cheating could occur without being detected has become insignificant.

Let me turn now to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Today, more than 20 countries may have or may be developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. Several have goals inimical to U.S. interests.

As you know, we try in many ways to prevent the spread of technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction. But this is difficult, because many of them are so-called "dual use technologies"—that is, they have legitimate civilian applications. Unduly restricting trade in these technologies would mean limiting the ability of developing nations to modernize.

For example, chemicals used to make nerve agents are also used to make plastics and pesticides. A modern pharmaceutical industry could produce biological warfare agents as easily as vaccines and

antibiotics. Much of the technology needed for a ballistic missile program is the same as that needed for a space launch program.

The threat from weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Currently, only China and the CIS have surface-to-surface missiles that can reach U.S. territory directly. We do not expect any other countries to develop the capability to threaten U.S. territory with air- or missile-delivered special weapons for at least another decade, but there is a growing threat to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

U.S. or multinational forces deployed abroad could face an increased threat of air-delivered nuclear weapons before the end of the decade. In addition, several countries already have missiles and rockets that could carry nuclear warheads; in coming years other countries will acquire such missiles, and some may try to arm them with nuclear warheads.

Most of the major countries in the Middle East have chemical weapon development programs, and some already have stockpiles that could be used against civilians or poorly defended military targets. Most countries have not yet equipped their delivery systems to carry weapons of mass destruction, but over the next decade, many countries, from North Africa through South Asia, will do so if international efforts to curtail this fail.

North Korea and possibly other countries may export extended-range missiles and the technology to produce them. Countries with special weapons that succeed in buying these missiles will accelerate the special weapons arms race already underway in the Middle East and South Asia.

Turning to the danger of technology leakage from Soviet successor states, our Government is leading an international effort to prevent, or at least minimize, the leakage of special weapons, materials, and knowhow from the Soviet successor states. President Yeltsin and most of the other republic leaders have announced policies to prevent a hemorrhaging of technology, especially in the nuclear realm.

Notwithstanding numerous reports and rumors, we are not aware of any significant transfer of such technology thus far, but life has become so difficult in the successor republics, for both industries and individuals formerly associated with Soviet special-weapons programs, that many of them may listen to the siren songs of Third World states that want such weapons.

The potential brain drain is probably the greatest danger. We estimate that nearly a million Soviets were involved in nuclear weapons programs in one way or another, but probably only a thousand or two have the knowhow to design nuclear weapons. Probably a few thousand have knowledge or skills applicable to the development and production of biological weapons.

We worry most about individuals whose skills have no civilian job counterpart, such as nuclear weapons designers and BW experts, for whom assistance mechanisms have not yet been put in place. They were well treated under the Soviet system, and will find it hard to get comparable positions now. Most Soviet scientists who want to emigrate probably would prefer to settle in the West, but the West probably cannot absorb all of them.

But some technology transfers that worry us will be legitimate. We expect the former Soviet Union's defense industrial sector to

market dual-use technologies, notably for nuclear power and space launch vehicles. For example, Russian and Ukrainian producers of space-launch vehicles are marketing launch services. ICBM producers are offering the SS-25 and other ICBMs as space launchers. Other nations with weapons development programs are certain to try to exploit the opportunity to get some of the world's most advanced weapons technology and materials at bargain prices.

I should add that other highly sophisticated, but less controlled "conventional" military technologies and weapons may also be made available for export by various successor states. Technologies particularly in demand include stealth, counterstealth, thermal-imaging, and electronic warfare. Weapons in demand include fuel-air explosives, precision-guided munitions, and advanced torpedoes.

Now looking at the major proliferators.

Iraq is still a major proliferation threat. Saddam built formidable programs in all four special weapons areas. Desert Storm significantly damaged Iraq's special weapons production programs, and the U.N. Special Commission has worked diligently to eliminate what remained of them. But we believe Baghdad has been able to preserve significant elements of each of the special weapons programs and, of course, Iraq's scientists and engineers retain their knowhow. So, once Iraq is free to begin rebuilding its special weapons capabilities, it will not have to start from scratch.

The Nuclear Weapon Development program would need the longest time to recover, perhaps a few years, because even though Iraq retains its nuclear knowhow and some equipment, much of the infrastructure for the production of fissile material would have to be rebuilt.

Much of the chemical weapons production infrastructure also would have to be rebuilt, but we believe Saddam may have preserved enough production capability to resume producing chemical agents almost immediately.

The biological weapons program also was damaged, but some critical equipment escaped damage during the war. Because only a small amount of equipment is needed, in the absence of sanctions, the Iraqis could be producing BW materials in a matter of weeks after a decision to do so.

We believe the Iraqis have been able to preserve some Scud-type missiles, along with much Scud and Condor production equipment. Before they could resume production, however, they might need to get additional equipment from abroad.

Iran is building up its special weapons capabilities as part of a massive, across-the-board effort to develop its military and defense industries.

Iran continues to shop Western markets for nuclear and missile technology and is trying to lure back some of the technical experts the Khomeini regime drove abroad during the 1980's. Increasingly, however, Iran has turned to Asian sources of military and technical aid, and it probably hopes contacts in Kazakhstan will allow it to tap into Soviet weapons technology.

Tehran's principal sources of special weapons since the Iran-Iraq war have been North Korea for regular- and extended-range Scuds and China for battlefield missiles, cruise missiles, ballistic missile technology and components, and nuclear technology.

Syria, too, has turned to North Korea. Because Damascus has been unable to get SS-23s from the Soviet Union, it acquired an extended range Scud missile from P'yongyang. It also appears to be seeking assistance from foreign firms to improve its CW or BW warhead technology.

Libya also is trying to expand its special weapons capabilities, but with only mixed success. We estimate that the production facility at Rabta produced and stockpiled as much as 100 tons of chemical agents before the Libyans cleaned it up, perhaps in preparation for the long-awaited public opening of the facility to demonstrate its alleged function of producing legitimate pharmaceuticals. But the plant is still capable of producing chemical agents. In any case, we believe the Libyans are constructing another chemical weapon production facility—one they hope will escape international attention.

In addition, for several years, the Libyans have been trying to build a BW facility, but without much success. We believe they would need foreign help to establish a significant BW program.

Thanks in part to U.S. efforts, the Libyans are having difficulty finding foreign help. Persistent international efforts to deny Libya access to nuclear, BW, and delivery system technology have forced Qadahfi to turn to the less advanced technology and less trustworthy sources available on gray and black markets in the developing world.

As a result, Libya is still unable to project its power very far. Both Russia and China have rejected Libya's efforts to purchase missiles with longer range than the Scuds it already possesses. Tripoli is now shopping diligently for an alternative source; South Korea has alleged that North Korea may be the answer.

Algeria is nearly finished building a nuclear reactor it brought from China. Both the Algerians and Chinese have assured us the reactor will be used only for peaceful purposes, but the secrecy that attended the arrangement leaves us with some lingering suspicions. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Algerian Government have recently completed an agreement to safeguard the reactor. The IAEA Board of Governors will review the agreement at its next meeting, after which more information on the safeguards will be available.

India and Pakistan continue their race to develop weapons of mass destruction. Not only do both countries have nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, they have recently pursued chemical weapons as well. We have no reason to believe that either country maintains assembled nuclear bombs, much less that either has deployed them. But such weapons could be assembled quickly, and both countries have combat aircraft that could be modified to deliver them in a crisis. One hopeful sign is that both have publicly agreed to certain confidence-building measures, such as not attacking each others' nuclear facilities.

Our government continues to oppose exports of space-launch vehicle or advanced computer technology to either country because of the high probability that such technology would end up in a long-range ballistic missile program.

North Korea constitutes one of the world's major proliferation threats. P'yongyang depends on arms sales for much of its hard

currency earnings. It has produced and sold copies of the Soviet Scud missile to several Middle Eastern countries. It has sold modified, longer-range Scuds to Iran and Syria. P'yongyang is developing a much larger missile, one with a range of at least 1,000 kilometers.

In addition, P'yongyang has been building an infrastructure that can, without input from abroad, produce weapons grade fissile material from scratch. It has domestic uranium mines. At Yongbyon, it has constructed two nuclear reactors whose sole purpose appears to be to make plutonium.

One of these reactors has been operating for 4 years; the second, much larger reactor, may start up this year. Nearly completed is another facility at Yongbyon that can reprocess reactor fuel to recover the plutonium. Even after North Korea accumulates enough plutonium, making a device would require several additional steps that could take months or even years.

Last December, North and South Korea negotiated an agreement in principle for a nuclear-free peninsula. Each side has committed itself not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use" nuclear weapons. Both sides also agreed not to have nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities.

There are, in a certain understatement, grounds for questioning the North's sincerity, given that it has not yet even admitted the existence of, much less declared, the plutonium production reactors and reprocessing facility at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center.

Moreover, verification procedures remain to be worked out. The validity of the North-South nuclear accord depends on the inspection regime P'yongyang ultimately accepts. Historically, North Korea has not been forthcoming in this area. It signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in December 1985 and was thereby obligated to declare and place all nuclear facilities under safeguards.

But only last month did P'yongyang get around to signing a safeguards agreement. So we wonder when the North Koreans will accept meaningful on-site inspections that could allay our suspicions.

Where North Korea is concerned, moreover, we have to worry not only about the consequences for stability in Northeast Asia if it acquires nuclear weapons, but also about the possibility that P'yongyang might put nuclear materials and related technologies on the international market. In the past, they have been willing to sell anything that could earn hard currency.

China has been an important exporter of ballistic missiles, nuclear reactors, and related technology. Beijing is developed two solid-fuel SRBM's, the M-9 and M-11, which exceed the range and payload limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime, 300 kilometers and 500 kilograms.

In the past, Beijing offered to sell these missiles, claiming that their range and payload parameters did not exceed the MCTR guidelines. More recently, the Chinese have indicated that they would honor the MCTR parameters and guidelines if certain U.S. Government sanctions are lifted.

Last fall, China announced its intention to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Once it has done so, it will be obligated to

require all recipients of its nuclear equipment to adhere to IAEA safeguards. China has long been a supplier of nuclear technologies in the Third World, but has not always required recipients to adhere to safeguards.

These commitments by China attest to the importance it attaches to relations with the United States. Because China values the U.S. market and desires continued Western investment and access to Western technology, and because Beijing and Washington have compatible foreign policy objectives in a number of regions, including Cambodia and Korea, China wants a solid working relationship with the United States.

There is certain to be continuing debate in Beijing over the pros and cons of accommodating U.S. and international interests on sales of military and nuclear equipment and technology, but by adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and MCTR guidelines, Beijing would become a formal supporter of both regimes. It would be a major step forward for international cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Let me now turn to some other areas where our interests are engaged, beginning with Iraq.

A year after Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein's control of Iraq's territory and people is eroding, mainly because he has not been able to extract his country from the grip of U.N. sanctions. Saddam has demonstrated an impressive capability to adapt and survive, but he now faces mounting unease within his inner circle and the Sunni Arab community, long his prime base of support.

Saddam's support is eroding among key segments of Iraq's population, including important tribal and family groups within the military and security services. They have become disaffected by the deteriorating economic conditions, the uneven distribution of food and medical supplies, and the lack of progress toward restoring a reasonable standard of living for most Iraqis.

The Kurdish uprising in the North and the Shia uprising in the South are also troublesome for Saddam, because they deflect resources that he could otherwise use to shore up support in his core constituencies. We do not believe, however, that either the Kurdish or Shia insurgencies threaten his regime directly.

Despite signs that discontent with Saddam's leadership is greater than ever before, fear and intimidation continue to prevent his opponents from acting individually, while disunity and the pervasive security system impede the formation of a collective opposition.

Consequently, we cannot say whether—much less when—public frustration or political and military defections will lead to his overthrow.

Turning to the Arab-Israeli peace talks, the talks are reducing the threat of open conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The willingness of most parties to come to the negotiating table to discuss economic and environmental issues, as well as territorial disputes and formulas for troop withdrawals, adopting of confidence building measures, international recognition and normalization of relations makes another Arab-Israeli war in the near term less likely.

The recent Israeli assassination of Hizballah leader Abbas Musawi and attacks on Palestinian camps and Hizballah strong-

holds in Lebanon are not likely to derail the peace process, at least not right away.

The major participants in the talks, despite continuing concerns about both procedural and substantive issues, remain committed to the process and appear unwilling to pay the price for being the first to bring about its demise.

To avenge Musawi's death, we expect Hizballah to step up terrorist attacks against Israeli targets, and the more radical Palestinian factions may join in. The Israelis can be expected to retaliate forcefully, perpetuating the cycle of alternating violence. In such an atmosphere, public positions harden and it becomes increasing difficult, especially for Arab governments, and the Palestinians, to justify their continued participation in the peace process. In addition, members of official Arab delegations increasingly will fear for their personal safety.

Let me say a word about Cuba.

Fidel Castro is facing unprecedented challenges to his regime's survival. With the end of substantial economic subsidies provided for decades by the Soviet Union, the Cuban economy is plunging. Factories are closing, and growing numbers of people are being moved to agricultural work camps.

The regime is now using beasts of burden to replace agricultural equipment and bicycles to supplement the crippled mass transit system. Meanwhile, as opposition from human rights activities and other emerging pockets of dissent increases, the regime has been responding with more brutal repression.

The rest of Latin America has enjoyed a dramatic transformation to elected civilian government, and there is a growing move away from statist to free market economic systems. These trends still face serious challenges in some countries, however.

In Peru, the Fujimori administration confronts a combination of highly threatening and intractable problems. It has the daunting mission of attempting to implement comprehensive and effective programs to address serious economic, insurgency, human rights, and narcotics programs simultaneously.

The threat to stability is exacerbated by the growing involvement of two powerful leftist and anti-U.S. terrorist and insurgent groups in narcotics activities.

The Sendero Luminoso, in particular, is a savage guerrilla organization that has gained sway over large areas of the Peruvian countryside and is increasingly active in Lima.

In Venezuela, President Perez remains firmly committed to economic reform despite social unrest and the attempted military coup early this month. Most of the military remained loyal to the President and the democratic system, and the people of Venezuela did not support the rebels. Nevertheless, the incident demonstrates that even stable democracies in the region remain vulnerable to the pressures generated by economic modernization.

The fourth and last part of my overview, Mr. Chairman, concerns other areas of national security importance. Aside from what we might call the traditional issues of national security, other issues that could threaten our national interests are demanding our attention.

An attribute they have in common is that they cannot be resolved simply through the application of military force or diplomacy.

Following are some examples:

International crime, including terrorism, narcotics trafficking, theft or technology, and the potential for massive sabotage of computer and information systems.

International economic problems, including energy security, unfair trade practices, the difficulties facing the GATT, collapsing economies, and massive public debt.

Problems affecting the viability of societies, such as overpopulation, hunger, and the spread of AIDS and other devastating diseases.

Environmental problems, associated with pollution and degradation of the air, land, and sea, including disposal of nuclear waste and toxic materials, deforestation, decertification, destruction of fisheries, global warming, and ozone depletion.

The last part of my presentation will be a kind of whirlwind tour of some of these issue areas. I do this to illustrate the real broad range of U.S. interests and involvement abroad and to emphasize the growing importance to our national security of nonmilitary issues.

U.S. citizens and property will remain frequent targets of foreign terrorists during the coming 2 years.

State-sponsored terrorism has declined considerably in the past year or 2, owing mostly to concerted international pressure on sponsors such as Libya and Iraq, but it remains a serious threat, because international terrorist groups supported by such states retain their capabilities. Among the state sponsors, Iran has become the most active, sponsoring attacks mostly against its own dissidents abroad as well as against Israeli interests.

Meanwhile, for mostly local reasons, anti-U.S. terrorism by domestic left-wing groups has increased in recent years in a number of countries, particularly in Greece, Turkey, Peru and the Philippines.

International events and developments sometimes stimulate terrorism. In the coming months, for example, positive developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process would be likely to trigger terrorist attacks by Palestinian or other opponents of such progress.

The news on the counternarcotics front is mixed. Significant progress in countering the cocaine trade has been made in the past 2 years, though cocaine remains our country's principal illicit narcotics problem.

Meanwhile, however, we are losing ground to the heroin traffickers.

At the same time as cocoa crops planted in 1989 mature, production has increased to 1,065 metric tons, an increase of 8 percent over last year.

We expect this production to decline this year and next. Nevertheless, the cocaine traffickers will continue to diversify their transshipment methods and routes, and Latin American leaders will be challenged to improve the effectiveness of their judicial systems in dealing with the drug trade. U.S. leadership and assistance, along

with a sustained, long-term commitment by the international community will be necessary to continue to make progress.

Heroin supplies to the United States will increase substantially over the next few years. Southeast Asia has emerged as the main source, producing more than half of the heroin consumed in the United States. Southwest Asia and Mexico also supply substantial amounts. Colombian cocaine producers are beginning to produce heroin since it is more lucrative than cocaine.

Nevertheless, many governments besides the United States face mounting public pressure to take action against heroin. As a result, the prospects for international cooperation on controlling heroin production and transshipment are improving.

Economic issues have become primary determinants of our national well being. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, is a good example of such an issue. With foreign trade now amounting to almost a quarter of our GDP, our economic interests require a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Indeed, most of the world would benefit from such a result.

Disagreements over the European Community's agricultural support system have been a stumbling block at the Uruguay Round. The United States, along with other agricultural exporters, such as Australia, Canada, and Brazil, want the EC members to cut sharply their export subsidies and reform agricultural policies that encourage overproduction. Most EC members recognize that the inefficient and costly system must be reformed, but want to proceed at a gradual pace.

U.S. interests are closely tied to mounting international environmental problems. Issues such as possible global warming, ozone depletion, shrinking forests, growing deserts, and the need to do a better job of disposing of hazardous waste are forcing governments worldwide to negotiate new international accords.

The problems are complicated by conflicting interests and incomplete and even contradictory scientific data. Nevertheless, it is already clear that traditional national security aims need now to be augmented by a new level of bilateral and regional cooperation to deal with issues of air, water, and soil pollution that cross international frontiers.

Population growth and migration will cause great social stresses in the coming decades. The political and economic systems of many developing countries are already overburdened by runaway population growth. Except for Asia and Latin America, where family planning programs are making some headway, most less-developed countries face even more rapid population growth in the years ahead as today's infants reach maturity.

One major source of instability will be the growing numbers of young people whose expectations will be higher than ever before as a result of improvements in health care and education, but who will be frustrated as they compete for fewer opportunities.

Ironically, many industrialized countries have the opposite problem: population growth rates that are so low that in some countries the population could actually decline. Fewer and fewer workers will have to provide for more and more older citizens. One solution, of course, is immigration from overpopulated parts of the world,

but many of the countries that need workers have relatively homogeneous populations which are not ready to incorporate large numbers of foreigners into their societies as full citizens. Thus, some countries facing a labor shortage may be neither willing nor able to absorb as many foreign workers as would be needed to resolve it.

But depending on large numbers of immigrant workers who are denied full rights of citizenship is inherently destabilizing. members of the European Community received more immigrants between 1988 and 1990 than during the entire previous decade. Not coincidentally, hostility toward immigrants has increased markedly in some of these countries.

Africa is on the front line in the race between progress and population growth. With the world's highest rates of population growth, Africans are finding it increasingly difficult to generate enough jobs or produce enough food and goods to maintain life at even a subsistence level.

Population growth also contributes to environmental degradation. Continual pressure to bring new land under cultivation combined with outmoded agricultural practices and inadequate conservation, has led to steady destruction of Africa's forests. How much this contributes to global warming is not clear, but it reduces biodiversity, the variety of genetic material available for pharmaceutical and agricultural research.

As you know, this country is spending about \$1 billion in aid to Africa this year, even though no country there threatens our national security.

Our interests are humanitarian: we don't want people to starve or die in droves from diseases such as AIDS.

Our interests are protective: twice in the past 2 years, our country has had to send troops to an African country to evacuate U.S. and other foreign citizens who were in danger from the collapse of public order.

Our interests are practical: if we are going to provide aid, it makes sense to try to send help before fragile democracies crumble, before weak economies collapse, before divided societies disintegrate.

Sub-Saharan Africa remains politically volatile despite the end of warfare in Angola and in Ethiopia last year.

In Sudan, the government's rigidly Islamist policies are prolonging the civil war.

Anarchy in Somalia has produced one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

Chad is an ethnic tinderbox, perennially vulnerable to Qadhafi, the regional arsonist.

After destroying a functional society, the fighting in Liberia has spilled over into Sierra Leone and threatens to disrupt the stability of other neighboring states.

Mozambique is moving toward a political settlement, but the civil war continues to take a huge toll on civilians and to disrupt neighboring countries.

Yet, democratization has brought peaceful transitions of power through elections in Zambia, Benin, Sao Tome, and Cape Verde.

Though there are risks:

Popular expectations may outpace the ability of fragile governments to deliver;

Voters will resent painful, but necessary economic austerity programs;

As demonstrated in the Horn of Africa, long-standing rivalries could surface, leading to seemingly endless conflict or secessionism.

Africans under economic duress may surrender tender democracies to Islamic extremists.

South Africa's effort to craft a truly democratic and equitable multiracial society resonates strongly in our own country. Key South African leaders appear committed to working out a more equitable system. Discussions of transitional arrangements and a new constitution are vital steps forward, but endemic violence threatens to halt progress. The violence may be exacerbated by the whites-only referendum scheduled for next month, in which de Klerk will seek a mandate to continue the reconciliation process.

The scourge of AIDS is now worst in Sub-Saharan Africa, but it is spreading at an alarming rate throughout the world. We estimate a cumulative total of over 10 million cases by the end of the decade. During the 1990's, AIDS in the Caribbean countries will proceed on a scale comparable to that of Africa, with similar dire results.

In India, Thailand and Brazil, AIDS is a major threat on the horizon and will contribute significantly to an estimated 45 million infections worldwide by the year 2000. The impact of AIDS in the 1990's will be far greater than in the 1980's, weakening elites and inflicting significant social and economic damage.

I could continue to describe other important areas the intelligence community is following. For example, I have hardly mentioned the countries of Europe or the Pacific Rim, on whose cooperation and goodwill our country's prosperity so heavily depends. I haven't mentioned the international technology race, or energy security, or the growing financial interdependence of modern societies. It is tough, and I might add long, to give a global briefing nowadays.

Instead, however, I would like to close with this observation. All historical experience suggests to us that, while the revolutionary upheavals we have seen and experienced have succeeded in breaking us loose from the past, the final shape of the future is far from established. We should expect continuing change and upheaval around the world, aftershocks, if you will, before the form and patterns of a new era settle into place.

Our national security institutions, especially defense and intelligence, must change—and they are changing dramatically—to meet the new and different challenges of this new and different world. But our changes must also conform to the reality of an unstable, unpredictable, dangerously overarmed and still-transforming world, not yet the world of our hopes and dreams.

We must avoid the costly mistake of 1919, 1945, 1953, and 1975 in thinking that we can disengage from the world and of too quickly disarming ourselves—of letting our hopes and our weary impatience overshadow our judgment, good sense, and historical realism.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking so long. That concludes my statement and I and my colleagues would be prepared to take your questions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.

THREATS OF NATIONAL INTEREST TO THE U.S.

At least as far as this member is concerned, you need offer no apology for the length of your statement. I do not recall a time in which the Director of Central Intelligence has given us such a comprehensive, detailed and specific review of the way you look at the world and the way the Central Intelligence Agency looks at the world.

Personally, I find your statement quite refreshing. I think it is quite consistent with the statements and observations you made during your long and arduous confirmation hearings and likewise consistent with the statements you have made recently to try to bring more openness into the intelligence community.

I recognize that is not easy for you to do. I want to say that I think you are moving in the right direction in the statements that you have made with respect to the openness of the community, and with respect to the kind of statement you have made before this committee this morning. I appreciate that direction.

Now, I want to get in my mind a sense of your view of the threats and kind of arranging of those threats to the national interest of the United States.

I gather from your statement that what really worries you more than anything else, at the very top of the list, would be the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.

Is that correct? Would you put that right at the top of the threats to the national interests of the United States at this point?

Mr. GATES. Mr. Chairman, the only thing that I would put above that is the uncertainty about the future course of Russia and the other nuclear-armed republics. There are so many challenges to the leadership and to the movement toward economic and political reform in Russia that I think it would be premature to take our sights off of a country that still possesses 30,000 nuclear warheads.

But with that single exception, I would say, of all of the potential threats, the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction is certainly our next most important.

CONCERN ABOUT FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me examine that concern that you have about the former Soviet Union just a moment.

Obviously uncertainty and instability are involved there, but you don't have any concern at this point that they will come charging across Europe or that they are going to launch ICBM nuclear strike against the United States?

Mr. GATES. No, sir. I think the chances of a war in Europe or a nuclear war launched by the Soviet or the Russian leadership has diminished almost to the vanishing point. What worries me is the unsettled nature of the situation there.

As I look at Vice President Rusk, Yeltsin's vice president, out trying to drum up support among former Communists, the mili-

tary, the military industrial complex, and I see the growing frustrations in Russia with the economic deprivation and hardship, the potential for some restoration of authoritarianism with unpredictable consequences for international affairs, I think, is something we have to very much bear in mind.

Mr. HAMILTON. How long do you think Yeltsin has for his reforms to work? How long can he stay in power?

Mr. GATES. I don't really know the answer for that, Mr. Chairman.

I would say this, he is, in my judgment, by far the most skilled politician in Russia today. He is committed to the reform process. He has a better feel for the pulse of the Russian people and how much they can take than probably anyone else.

That said, our estimate is that his popular standing is at about 40 percent, and at a time of considerably growing frustration inside the country.

Rutskoy, his own vice president, is calling his own—Yeltsin's own reform program devastating to the country. So I think that he—what I am trying to say is, I think he has the political skill that he will make some compromises and make the adjustments in the reform program that will, I think, keep him in power, keep the Democratic forces in power, keep him in power for the foreseeable future.

But if there should be a disaster of some kind or something should happen to him—I guess one thing I should say is, I think Yeltsin comes close, from my vantage point, to being almost indispensable to the reform process at this point. He is the engine for it at this stage. He is the political guiding hand for it. Were he to disappear from the scene for political or other reasons, I think that everyone's forecast of the prospects for reform in Russia would decline significantly.

SCENARIOS OF PREPARATION FOR WAR

Mr. HAMILTON. You saw, I am sure, the seven scenarios that the Pentagon put out with regard to preparation for war. I don't need to list them for you; I know you are familiar with them. But there does appear to be some distant connection between what the Pentagon is looking at as the threats to the national security and what you are looking at.

Am I wrong in that judgment, or to what extent is there coordination here between your assessments and the Pentagon?

Mr. GATES. The Pentagon certainly receives our assessments of the matters that I have referred to you, or referred to in my statement and that we have been talking about. My understanding is, the intelligence background for those illustrative options that were put together was the Defense Intelligence Agency.

While there isn't an overlay in terms of the scenarios, I think that most of them are quite compatible with our view in the respect of potential for danger and conflict in Korea, in the Persian Gulf area, in several of these scenarios. I think there is a compatibility between our assessment and our concerns and the illustrative options they put forward.

REFORM PROPOSAL FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to pursue that with you further at some time. I would like to ask another question and turn to Mr. Gilman. Two of our colleagues in the Congress, the two Chairmen of the Intelligence Committees have submitted, as you know, a major reform proposal for the entire intelligence community. I am not aware that I have heard any comment from you with respect to that proposal. I certainly don't want to bring you out prematurely on that, but I would be interested in your reaction to that to the extent that you think you can provide it at this time.

Mr. GATES. I would simply say that I think both of the Chairmen, both Mr. McCurdy and Senator Boren at their press conference announcing their legislation made clear from their standpoint it was the beginning of a dialog.

I think that there is broad agreement among us on the need for change. I think there is broad agreement among us on the specific areas that need addressing and restructuring.

We have a number of far reaching changes under way or task forces that are about to report in terms of changes that will be recommended either to the President or to the Congress if legislation is needed; and I think that once that work is completed, and I expect it not to take too long, that we will have a good basis for that dialog, and I am not sure much further legislation will be required at that point.

Mr. HAMILTON. The proposal for a new Director of National Intelligence and the narrowing of the CIA mission and all that, can you comment on that for us?

Mr. GATES. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I would rather not get into the specifics before I have had a chance to talk about them with the Chairmen of the two Intelligence Committees.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is fair enough.

Mr. Gilman.

IS THERE ANY CENTRAL MILITARY AUTHORITY?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gates, we certainly commend you for this extensive review of world problems. I think you have a full plate ahead of you, as we all do, in trying to confront some of these major issues affecting world peace. With respect to the Commonwealth's military is there some central figure now we can rely on to bring all of the military problems together?

There used to be the Defense Minister. I am not sure how effective he is with all the fragmentation of the republics. What is your assessment of whether or not there is any central military authority?

Mr. GATES. The nuclear command and control is in the hands of Yeltsin and General Shaposhnikov, head of the CIS military.

He will have deputies for the strategic forces and another for the conventional forces. Shaposhnikov probably comes as close to being a central military figure as any in any of the republics at this point because of his Commonwealth role. I think he'll continue to have a leading and coherent role in command and control of the strategic forces.

The agreement of the eight republics to subordinate their conventional forces to the Commonwealth for at least a transitional period of a couple of years certainly gives him heavy responsibilities in that arena as well.

But with Ukraine, Belarus, and other republics interested in establishing their own independent conventional forces, his ability to bring all of these forces together, in many respects I think, will be increasingly limited as those conventional forces continue to fragment.

Mr. GILMAN. Does Shaposhnikov have the support of the military? He had a great deal of credibility before this. Does he still have that credibility?

Mr. GATES. He seems to have a good deal of credibility. Particularly on the strategic side there is a general view he is doing his best to try and defend military interests.

That said, there are a growing number of divisions—and I don't mean the military formations, political divisions—within the CIS military and within the republics of the former Soviet Union.

We have evidence of local commanders cutting deals with local authorities to get food and shelter for their people and, in some respects, for example, obtaining food and shelter, the central military authorities seem to have less and less of a relevant role because there is so little they can do.

That said, I still go back, Shaposhnikov certainly does not have the power or clout that Marshal Ogarkov or Marshal Lustinov had 10, 15 years ago. But I would say that there is still a willingness on the part of most of the military to defer to him as their senior officer.

Mr. GILMAN. Is Shaposhnikov moving any troops out of any other republics?

When we met with him several months ago, he said I don't have housing for them; how can I move them out? We have all sorts of problems until we find adequate housing. They had 200,000 or 300,000 troops in various republics.

Mr. GATES. I don't think there have been any substantial movements of troops. He would like to move some of them. For example, as I mentioned in my statement, I think the Russian leaders believe that both Ukraine and Belarus have difficult proportionate levels of both manpower and equipment in their military because of the way they were part of the Warsaw Pact and poised against NATO.

He would like to bring some of those troops back, but the political implications of that are tied up in things like the division of the Black Sea fleet, so it becomes very political. Any move like that can be very dangerous in terms of provoking political conflict between Moscow and the heads of some of the other republics. So I think he is proceeding with some considerable caution in that arena.

Mr. GILMAN. I assume we are watching that very closely.

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

NARCOTICS BATTLE

Mr. GILMAN. I know your agency is involved in shifting some of our assets around. I hope you will be directing more assets to the battle on narcotics. I appreciated your counter-narcotics comments, but we certainly need a great deal more in that direction. We hope that you will be concentrating in this area.

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF IRAQ

Mr. GILMAN. One other question. With respect to the recent article that appeared in this morning's Washington Post with regard to Saddam Hussein's regime committing crimes against humanity by murdering thousands upon thousands of Kurds in northern Iraq in 1988 and burying them in mass graves, the special U.N. investigator having accused Iraq of human rights violations unparalleled since the Nazi atrocities of World War II, have we been taking a look at that problem and are you assessing the validity of these reports?

Mr. GATES. I have just seen that particular report in the paper, Mr. Gilman. We have documented Iraqi depredations against the Kurds, and Shias, for that matter, over the past several years, including what we believe to be the chemical attack on the Kurds several years ago.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope that you would be taking an in-depth look at that and reporting to Congress with respect to it at a later date.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Gates.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF IRAQ

Mr. SOLARZ. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gates, in your judgment, if we had not gone to war against Iraq, do you believe that Saddam Hussein would have had nuclear weapons by this time?

Mr. GATES. Yes. We believe that he would have had a workable nuclear device this year.

Mr. SOLARZ. And if he had obtained nuclear weapons, do you think there is a possibility that he might have used them?

Mr. GATES. I think so, given the attitude and approach that he took over the past year-and-a-half, I think that is a distinct possibility.

Mr. SOLARZ. In retrospect, do you think there is any possibility whatsoever that the continued reliance on sanctions alone would have induced Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait and to voluntarily dismantle his nuclear weapons program?

Mr. GATES. No, sir, not a chance.

Mr. SOLARZ. You indicated in your testimony that he is not fully cooperating in the dismantlement of his nuclear weapons program. What elements of that program do we believe he still has and has been unwilling to turn over or dismantle?

Mr. GATES. We are not entirely sure what he has. Let me give an answer and ask our National Intelligence Officer for Proliferation Issues to add to my answer.

What we have found, in addition to the calutrons and other nuclear-related materials, in recent times has been more in the way of documentation, both for even sources of his nuclear supplies, supplies for his nuclear program, documentation of the degree of progress they had made in terms of their program, and of the breadth of that program.

In terms of other kinds of related equipment that he may be trying to hide, let me ask Dr. Oehler if he would like to add.

Mr. OEHLER. We believe that he most likely has a significant amount of machine tools and other precision equipment needed to manufacture the components for nuclear devices. Since those are very much dual-use items, they would be hard to identify as being specifically part of the nuclear program.

Mr. SOLARZ. But no hidden reactors that we are aware of?

Mr. OEHLER. There are rumors from time to time, as I am sure you are aware. We have not been able to pin them down, but we are constantly looking for them.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is there a possibility he may have a hidden reactor?

Mr. OEHLER. We always keep that as a possibility.

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Gates, could you give us your best judgment about whether North Korea is, in fact, genuinely and sincerely willing to terminate its nuclear weapons program, or is it your judgment that the signing of the IAEA agreement and their commitment to South Korea for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is, in essence, a ruse designed to diminish the possibility of economic sanctions and possibly other actions against them, while they continue their efforts to obtain nuclear weapons? What is the basis for your judgment?

Mr. GATES. We are skeptical of their intentions, Mr. Chairman. We would note that they have not declared the facilities that they have, they have not declared all of them under their obligation of the NPT dating from 1985. We have some information that I cannot go into here in this setting that suggests that they have a deception plan for hiding their nuclear capabilities.

They have stalled in the past and in terms of agreeing to inspection regimes, for all of these reasons and the progress we see them continuing to make in their program and their willingness to sell whatever they can manufacture, we have some scepticism as to where they are headed and the likelihood of it having a political component.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we see them continuing their nuclear weapons program, based on intelligence available at the present time?

Mr. GATES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. Assuming they continue that program, how long do you estimate it would take for them to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material to make a weapon and how long would it take them to weaponize it?

Mr. GATES. We think a few months to as much as a couple of years.

Mr. SOLARZ. A few months to produce the fissile material?

Mr. GATES. To have a weapon.

Mr. SOLARZ. To have a weapon.

Mr. GATES. A range between a few months and a couple of years.

Mr. SOLARZ. Based on the failure of the IAEA which inspected the Iraqi nuclear facilities to detect Iraqi cheating, are there any changes in the IAEA methods of procedure that we believe will have to be made in order to give us, the South Koreans, Japanese and the rest of the world some confidence that, if North Korea agrees to permit IAEA to inspect its facilities, the North Koreans will have actually ceased their efforts to obtain nuclear weapons?

Mr. GATES. Let me answer in this way, Mr. Chairman. I think that we would have concern whether the IAEA inspection regime would be adequate to, given what we know about the North Korean program.

Mr. SOLARZ. So is there any inspection regime that we think could give us confidence that North Korea has stopped?

Mr. OEHLER. We believe it is possible to put together an inspection regime in conjunction with the IAEA and those details, hopefully, will be worked out to all of our satisfactions in the negotiations between the North and the South.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would that require the right to make challenge inspections?

Mr. OEHLER. Certainly, challenge inspections in our mind would be an important part of any such regime.

Mr. SOLARZ. An essential part?

Mr. OEHLER. Essential.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. Lagomarsino.

NEW INFORMATION ON POW/MIA'S

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as is not uncommon, you asked a number of questions I was going to ask, especially about Iraq.

Mr. Director, could you tell me because of my interest in the subject, and that of Mr. Solarz and Mr. Gilman, the role of the CIA with respect to those still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, the POW/MIA's?

Mr. GATES. The primary action in the intelligence community for this, Mr. Lagomarsino, is with the Defense Intelligence Agency. All of our collection capabilities that we have in Southeast Asia are—have as their top priority the gathering of information on POWs and MIAs and that information is all fed to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is your agency working with the KGB to try to uncover what information they might have about that subject? I understand they have volunteered to make available what information is available in their files.

Mr. GATES. I think they have offered that to our policy officials and perhaps also to some representatives of the Select Committee on the Senate side. We are not working with them directly on that because it is being handled in the regular policy channel.

CHINA'S EXPORTS OF DANGEROUS MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. China has made a number of commitments to control its exports of dangerous military technologies, including nuclear, chemicals, missiles; but we keep hearing about new instances of Chinese deals with states, particularly in the Middle East, that can threaten international security.

In your view does the Chinese Government really intend to abide by the new obligations it will accept, or says it will, under the non-proliferation treaty and Missile Technology Control Regime?

Mr. GATES. Well, sir, I think the only answer I can give you is that we will be watching them very closely, and I think we will be able to detect whether they are abiding by their word.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You don't have any information to indicate they are not now?

Mr. GATES. We don't have anything today that would indicate a preconceived plan to cheat, if you will.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is China continuing to transfer such materials at this time, as far as we know?

Mr. GATES. The Chinese are engaged in the sale of nuclear—peaceful nuclear technologies to a number of countries, and our concern is that in a couple of these instances the circumstances are such that we are suspicious that at some point in the future a nuclear infrastructure that is put in and is genuinely for peaceful purposes, or appears to be for peaceful purposes, could at some later time take on a weapons production aspect, perhaps a few years from now when people are not paying as close attention.

But we have no indication that I am aware of that they are selling technologies now that would be a violation of the agreements they have signed up to now.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. They are not doing it at this time?

Mr. GATES. I am pretty sure. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. In your opinion, is the Chinese Government willing, or able for that matter, to control exports by Chinese industries and military organizations?

Mr. GATES. My impression is that there is a certain tension inside the Chinese Government between the Foreign Ministry and some political officials and the Defense Ministry, which is allowed to keep the profits from these arms sales as a means of financing their own military modernization and military forces.

I think what we have seen in the recent past, in terms of the agreement on MTCR and the decision not to go ahead and ship certain kinds of missiles, is the political forces in effect in the Chinese Government winning the political struggle in terms of what the policies of the Chinese Government should be on that score.

FUTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is it your—switching back to Iraq—opinion that Saddam Hussein can and or will be deposed sometime in the near future?

Mr. GATES. Yes, I think he will be. I think none of us has the ability to predict when that will be. We believe, based on a variety of things that I mentioned in my testimony, troubles in the army, troubles in the family, trouble in the security services, trouble in

the sunny heartland, tribal disaffection by some of those that have been most closely associated with him in the past, all suggest he is certainly under greater pressure now than he has been at any time since the war.

As long as the U.N. sanctions continue, I think those pressures will continue to increase.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I might say that many of the people in Kuwait with whom I have talked are very concerned that he will be replaced, but by someone just as evil and bad from their perspective, and that we and the rest of the world will lose interest or at least not be as concerned about that successor as we are about Saddam Hussein.

As I say, they are very concerned about that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. Johnston.

FINDINGS AFTER THE WAR ABOUT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Gates, we have a pool over here that feels Mr. Hussein may be deposed around October.

Let me follow up on the question by Mr. Solarz dealing with nuclear weapons and Iraq, weapons and Iraq. You stated that you feel that there is a workable nuclear device this year. I wrote down your comment, your colleague's, saying they have machine tools and a possibility of a hidden reactor. Your predecessor appeared before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in the fall, I would say, of 1990 before Desert Shield.

After the invasion of Iraq—of Kuwait by Iraq, that is. His testimony before Senator Nunn's committee was that it would take between 5 and 10 years for Iraq to produce one nuclear bomb, that they did not have sufficient uranium, that the IAEA had investigated this country, and that they were using uranium for the purposes of nuclear power.

The day after the invasion of Kuwait, this committee had a private briefing in this very room by members of your agency that confirmed about the same thing, that they were between 5 and 10 years away from having a nuclear weapon.

My question to you is, what do you know today that you did not know then, prior to Congress taking action on the resolution for a declaration of war?

Mr. GATES. We have learned a great deal, Mr. Johnston, in the U.N. inspection process and through sources acquired since, subsequent to the war, which have given us a great deal more information about the Iraqi program than we ever had before. We were correct—the intelligence community, I think, was correct in its assessment that the Iraqis had an aggressive nuclear weapons program before the war. But clearly the entire intelligence community and, in fact, all the other intelligence services around the world equally were in error in underestimating both the pace and the scale of the Iraqi program; and only as we have gotten information by virtue of the U.N. inspections and through sources that have been developed only in the last half-dozen months or 10 months or so have we learned just how much he had going on and how close they were.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ON OTHER COUNTRIES PROLIFERATION CAPABILITIES

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Gates, I appreciate your very candid answers.

This is a friendly question, but what assurance do we have that your intelligence and your information is any better today than it was then on India, Algeria, North Korea, Syria, Pakistan, all the countries that you enumerated?

Mr. GATES. Well, sir, this is—I will be honest with you; this is a real problem for us. I am one of the—one of the initiatives that I have put in place or am putting in place in the intelligence community is significantly to strengthen our overall collection on the proliferation issue, but especially our human source collection. I believe that, particularly with respect to chemical and biological programs, but also as we learned from Iraq on the nuclear program, that precision of our information depends very much on high-quality human intelligence reporting. We clearly need to strengthen that on the proliferation problem.

ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS IN SOUTHERN TIER OF FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me shift to another area. On page 14 of your testimony you stated that Africans under economic duress may surrender democracies to Islamic extremists.

Do you have that same fear in the southern tier of the former U.S.S.R?

Mr. GATES. Not yet, in the respect that some of those republics have not made much progress toward democracy yet.

What we are seeing to a degree is a vying for influence between the Iranians on the one hand and the other Islamic countries on the other. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt are all active in central Asia, all trying to counter the Iranian influence. That is where the political struggle that we can see tends to be focussed right now, as far as the Islamic aspects of this whole approach.

We do not see the emergence yet in any of these republics of what we would call either fundamental Islam or extreme Islam, but it is a potential—it is a concern and a potential problem.

OVERPOPULATION

Mr. JOHNSTON. Just one last observation. I joined with the chairman on a very fine comprehensive report here, Mr. Gates, and it is almost like CNN around the world in a hour here, but I do make this observation.

You mentioned no less than five times the threat of overpopulation in the world, that it is causing problems, humanitarian, environment, and the whole thing. I wish you would talk to the President about it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROCUREMENT

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gates, I want to join many of my colleagues who have already expressed their commendation to you for the breadth and quality of the presenta-

tion, your report to this committee, and I know that some of us will attempt to bring it to the full attention of our colleagues here.

I have two very brief suggestions and then one question.

In looking at the procurement policies and programs of the intelligence community, I am very impressed with the way things are done and the speed with which things are done and the economy to the government. I would think that, while it is difficult for you to trumpet those things, it would be important for the defense community, for the Pentagon, to take a look at what kind of procedures they could change to benefit from the intelligence community's experience. As a person over at the National Security Council for some period of time, perhaps you would have that ability, to be a convincing advocate for changes in the Defense Department procurement, based on what you do well.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION OF FORMER SOVIET UNION

Secondly, I think the level of environmental degradation in what is the Confederation of Independent States is beyond most peoples' understanding. For a semi-developed society to do the damage they have done to the environment and to citizens of those republics is really an appalling lesson for us.

Whether or not it has occurred to people who work for you, you probably have concentrated in your agency more information about environmental damage, what has happened to morbidity rates and so on, in what was the Soviet Union than any other place. To the extent that you could declassify that information and make that known to the world community, including the people living in the CIS, I think it would be a service to the people that live on this globe.

So I would ask you to think about sharing as much of that information as you possibly can with the world.

Mr. GATES. I will take a look at it.

PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES WORLDWIDE

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Finally, the question. I understand that substantial requirements are being levied on your agency and the intelligence community to assist you in peacekeeping efforts around the world, as well as EC efforts in Yugoslavia. To the extent you can tell us about how international peacekeeping efforts call upon your resources and the way you are meeting them, I think it would be valuable for this committee to hear it if you can do it in this forum.

Mr. GATES. Let me just say, sir, that we have for a long time provided a great deal of support to a variety of arms control efforts and also to Middle East peacekeeping for almost 20 years now.

In recent years we have been asked by the State Department to provide them with information that is relevant to the needs of various peacekeeping forces around the world, and we have tried to work closely with the State Department in providing them information that they then could make available to others for peacekeeping activities around the world.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Faleomavaega.

PROLIFERATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Mr. FALCOMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to commend you, Mr. Gates, for the thorough and comprehensive statement you presented before this committee this morning.

I have a couple of questions. You have accurately described the problems we face regionally, as well as globally, concerning the proliferation of nuclear capabilities among certain countries.

It seems to me there is also a concern in proliferation of intelligence within our own government. I just wanted to ask you about General Schwarzkopf's observations during the Persian Gulf war that he had a very difficult time working with the intelligence community. How accurate was the intelligence information given to the General—information he was depending on to make military decisions? You, probably more than anyone else, can appreciate this problem.

Does this problem still exist?

Mr. GATES. Part of the problem that we have was focused primarily in terms of getting information from the commander in chief at CENTCOM to the battlefield commander at the division and battalion level.

Let me just say though that, as General Powell has pointed out, the intelligence available to the American commanders here in Washington and in the field was the best intelligence any commander had ever had. We knew exactly where all 42 Iraq divisions were, what they were armed with, the technical characteristics of virtually every weapons system they brought to bear in the battle. The highly specified targeting of the smart weapons was dependent on intelligence about where the command and control and communications systems were. So there was a great deal of very accurate intelligence available to the commander.

There clearly were some shortcomings. It has been a long time since the United States has fought a major war like that. They made use of a lot of national intelligence systems that in previous wars had never been used by America or had not been used on anything like that scale by American military commanders there.

We learned a lot of lessons. We have taken steps to try and improve support to military operations. I have just appointed with General Powell's and Secretary Cheney's concurrence, a Major General to be the Associate Deputy Director for Operations for CIA's clandestine service in an effort to improve both human intelligence support to military operations, as well as overall intelligence community support to military operations.

So in those areas where we have had shortcomings, we are taking steps to try and improve it.

PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND OUR POLICY OF SELLERS OF THESE ARMS

Mr. FALCOMA. There is a firm belief among certain Third World country leaders that, if you want parity or to equalize your strength to deal with the United States, you must have nuclear capabilities. I believe Saddam Hussein was one of the great advocates of this philosophy.

Can you reconcile this problem that I have? Our country is concerned with proliferation of nuclear armaments, and I certainly cannot agree with you more on this; yet, we are among the biggest sellers of guns, bullets, tanks, which since World War II, has caused more deaths and human sufferings than the atomic bombs we dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I have a little problem in seeing the seriousness of our attempts to alleviate this kind of military problem because we are among the very ones that are producing these devices which cause more harm and deaths throughout the world. I have a little problem with that.

Can you respond to that?

Mr. GATES. Sir, I am in the fortunate position of being able to say that issue you have raised is fundamentally a policy question and not an intelligence question. So I am really not in a position to address that.

I would simply—I would say, however, that it has been my experience that many of the arms sales that you state have made over the years have been to our friends who were threatened in one way or another.

It is a problem. That is why the United States, I think, tried to put together this effort by the Permanent Five last fall to reduce the level of arms sales to the Middle East. We have taken a run at conventional arms limitations on several occasions over the years and have not met with very much international support or help. So it is a tough problem.

But for a more sophisticated answer, I think I would have to refer you to my colleagues at the State and Defense Departments.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will wait for the next round.

OVERPOPULATION

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take too much of my precious few moments to say the things I would like to say in praise of Mr. Gates' presence in his present office, not to say the presentation today, but in my memory I don't know of anyone any more competent than you, Mr. Gates, in this very important position. So I am glad you are there.

I just want to comment parenthetically about the statement made about overpopulation. It is a problem. I note, however, that many industrialized countries, according to your testimony, have the open opposite problem. Population growth-rates are so low that in some countries the population could actually decline. Fewer workers will have to provide for more and more older citizens.

You suggest, as a solution, immigration, but this is not greeted very warmly by countries with homogeneous populations, and you see a destabilizing situation where workers have to be imported from, say, Third World countries who have too many people to places, say, in Europe, Germany, for example, with too few people.

So I know there are those who don't think the United States should be policeman to the world. Many of those same people

would like us to be gynecologists to the world. I am not sure we can handle that an assignment.

I do know that America—and if you are talking to the President, as the gentleman suggested, you might remind him, we are the largest single contributor to family planning in the world. So we do our best.

RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ BEFORE WAR

Now, Iraq versus Iran, the administration is taking a beating because, apparently, of some support that Iraq was given before the war. I can understand when you have 2—I'll say 400-pound gorillas, not 800-pound gorillas—Iraq and Iran, both rogue countries in the same part of the world contending with each other, I think conventional strategy from Richelieu and before down through Kissinger and later would be to play one off against the other, rather than to confront both of them head on or to, in the opposite direction, walk away from them.

So playing one off against the other wasn't so dumb, but it is high risk and it turned out that, in our assistance to Iraq, Iraq bit the hand that fed it and invaded Kuwait.

Hindsight is wonderful, but I would hope that our great statesmen today who are assessing blame would understand the choice between Iran and Iraq wasn't a very big one.

I regret that I am not asking questions, I am making statements. I so seldom get a chance to visit with you, Mr. Gates, anymore that I want to tell you something interesting that happened over the weekend.

I was in Moscow and—my first visit there, and I was talking to a very high intelligence official, and he blamed us for Saddam Hussein's presence in an interesting way. He said the only way to get rid of Saddam Hussein is through the army, but when we supported the Kurds and the Shias, we drove the army into a defensive posture around Saddam Hussein because they are very concerned about Shia control of their country, which would mean the ascendancy of Iran.

So in our support for the beleaguered minorities in Iraq, the Kurds as well, we consolidated the army around Saddam Hussein, who are the only agency to get rid of him.

I thought that was an interesting analysis. I don't know if it is true or not, but it was very interesting.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS

There is so much I would like to talk about and my time is going. The fundamentalists, as you mentioned, the fundamentalist Moslems, are they generally anti-Western—anti-American and anti-Western and anti-democratic? The point I am trying to make is, I suggest they are, and their ascendancy in Algeria, even though it was through a democratic process, could have been a very dangerous thing in the long run for this terrible struggle between moderate and radical Moslems in that part of the world.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. GATES. I think our view of it is often shaped by what we have seen with the Shias in Iran, and we certainly have seen fun-

damentalists elsewhere, Islamic Fundamentalists hostile to what we would consider democratic values and also the United States.

I am not ready yet to concede that Islamic Fundamentalism is, by its nature, anti-Western and anti-democratic. There are some fundamentalist elements in the region—they are not in power—that are not necessarily that way, and I think that it is also in evolution.

There certainly are some that are anti-Western and anti-democratic and anti-U.S. I think it is premature. This is a phenomenon that we have seen really over a period of a dozen years or so, arising out of the Iranian revolution—of some small part of it before that, too—but I would hesitate to make that judgment yet.

DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

One of the concerns that I have—and I tried to say it at the end of my statement—there is a temptation, I think particularly in this country, to look at developments around the world with much too short a time horizon.

We were talking a little bit before the hearing, before the hearing began, about developments in the CIS. This is a country, Russia, where we have seen not just the overthrow of a 75-year-old Soviet Communist revolution, but the end of a 1,000-year Russian empire.

The notion that an empire so vast and so old should go down the drain in so short a time and for there not to be aftershocks, for there not to be continuing difficulties, for this not to be a very long-term process of adjustment in that huge country, I think betrays a sense of need for immediate gratification that is not historically warranted here.

This is going to be a two-generation process in Russia. The same thing is true of some of these developments such as the European Community, the developments we are seeing in the Middle East, the peace process, we need to cultivate a little greater sense of patience with some of these movements of historical consequence, and I find too little willingness to do that.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up; if I may be permitted one brief comment.

I couldn't agree more. To me, the most astonishing thing is how politely we dismiss something that is more than the equivalent of the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with the ethnic problems it has among others.

It is going to take a long time for that to shake itself out. We are salivating at the prospect of spending a peace dividend. From your overview, the threat has changed obviously, but it hasn't lessened cumulatively.

You look at North Korea, the Middle East, the problems in Africa and the rest of the world. I don't see much of a peace dividend. I hope people with some judgment and long-range understanding retrospectively and prospectively of the historical horizon are in charge of our Congress and not go charging off disestablishing our military and our intelligence institution. I am not all that hopeful.

You mentioned the lack of human intelligence, our capability in the Middle East. We did that to ourselves a few years ago by dismantling the human intelligence capability.

I don't want to get political, but it wasn't during this or the predecessor administration. We are paying a price for that and I hope we in Congress understand that and learn from those mistakes and don't repeat them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Sawyer.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me be as brief as I can. Last week we had Director Roskens of U.S. AID with us. We talked about the character of the economic collapse within the Soviet Union, the direction that it may take, and our capacity to be of technical assistance as they make this long and difficult transition not only from a 1,000-year empire, but from one kind of an economy to a more modern Western-style economy.

One of the ways we might be of assistance to them is in the realm of technical assistance and providing them with the capacity to measure their economic change.

The CIA has in the past been deeply involved in that kind of economic measurement and was the statistical tools necessary to continue to do so effectively.

Would the CIA be in a position to help gather together this kind of assistance in an attempt to stabilize the Soviet republics and the former Soviet states as they make this difficult transition?

Mr. GATES. Certainly.

We would be prepared to provide whatever expertise and statistical modeling and other technical assistance that we might offer to AID or the State Department or anybody who might want to use it with respect to the CIS.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Smith.

CROATIA

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The first question deals with the war in Croatia which has claimed in excess of 10,000 lives, displaced 600,000, tens of thousands more have been wounded, and the estimates are very high as to the infrastructure damage sustained by Croatia and by neighboring republics as a result of that war.

Based on your intelligence analysis, how confident are you that the United Nations' effort and EC peace initiatives will produce an end to the conflict and involve a lasting settlement and how do you rate the possibility of tensions perhaps erupting into all-out warfare, but short of that, incidences of violence in Bosnia and some of the other Republics that were Yugoslavia.

Mr. GATES. When I turn to Yugoslavia, the temptation is to break out history books instead of briefing books. There are no guarantees, but I think that the creation of the circumstances in which the U.N. peacekeepers can go into Yugoslavia in the first instance is a positive development.

I think the first advance teams will be going in shortly before the larger deployer. I think there is a certain degree of mutual exhaustion that has taken place.

While Croatia has borne the brunt of casualties, Serbia has paid a tremendous price in terms of impacts on its economy and price of military operations. The signs would point to the fact that the leaders of all these different factions are prepared at last to let the U.N. come in.

It probably won't be totally smooth sailing, but I think the prospects as of February 25 look good. The same is true in Bosnia and Segovia because I think the parties have agreed to observe the current boundaries of Bosnia, which would be a positive thing, and we will see how they work out the problems in terms of minorities within Bosnia.

Right now I would say that in a situation that is a terrible tragedy of the nineties, there is at least a glimmer of hope that the U.N. may be able to get in there and put an end to this fighting.

OVERPOPULATION

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. In your statement on page 13, you state the population growth also contributes to environmental degradation.

I would just issue a word of caution. In my view, at least, when we begin to say that people are—of course, all people contribute in some way to pollution. They also contribute hopefully to finding the solutions to our pollution problem, but I think we perhaps unwittingly will usher in a mindset, particularly in some of the developing countries and develop in some of those countries where you have a dictator at the helm; i.e., the People's Republic of China, where this becomes a rationale for those measures that impose upon families a decision that ought to be left with the families, that is how many children they would like to have and the government steps in as a big brother saying, "For you, two ought to be the number," or "For you, three ought to be the number," or in the case of the PRC, only one child per couple.

This may be an innocuous statement that it contributes to environmental degradation. We fly airplanes and use cars to get to work, so we are all contributing to the problem of pollution, but I think it might smack at some kind of presumption when we say there is not room enough on planet Earth for a someone else because of our lifestyles and because we may be contributing in some way.

I think the challenge ought to be how do we mitigate pollution, how do we find as we go into the year 2000 and beyond, finds ways of correcting our pollution problems and environmental degradation.

But I think it has led to some very disastrous policies in some countries and I, having been in the People's Republic of China, can tell you that one of the rationales offered by the hardliners in Beijing was they want to keep pollution down.

When you look at a child, there is a temptation to go beyond what Government ought to go beyond in saying that there isn't room for that additional child.

You mentioned Africa in your statement as well. It is really a word of caution that this can be misused by many, especially by dictatorships around the world.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Payne.

AFRICA

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Let me say first, Mr. Gates, that I have sat before a number of persons giving the global view from their perspective, the Secretary of State and others. You are the first one that I have seen pay any attention to Africa.

I would like to commend you for that thorough picture of the world because many of our administrators act as though that continent with so many problems and so many people and so much potential, doesn't exist.

ATROCITIES IN IRAQ

So I would like to commend you for a thorough picture. I also agree that we have to be careful that we don't send a wrong message to totalitarian-type governments where they are imposing a number of children on people, but I think governments are also wrong when they impose on a woman the right to choose.

We can see we have both spectrums of that picture here. It is bad to tell you what you can have, it is also bad to tell you what you can't have.

I have read about some of the atrocities that have happened in reaching Iraq with the Kurds is horrible. But I have also read about atrocities that seem to be happening in the country we recently liberated, so the rightful rulers could go back into Kuwait.

Do you have any information concerning women who were to have been in the embassies at the time the Kuwaitis were back in power that were supposed to have been raped and beaten?

The representative to the United States from Kuwait says that did not happen. It troubles me to read those kinds of accounts.

Do you have any insight on that?

Mr. GATES. I only recall seeing a newspaper article to that effect. I don't think we have any independent information, but I will check on that and if we have something, we will have somebody get back in touch with you.¹

AFRICA

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

I hope you could talk to the Secretary of State because you indicated there is a billion dollars that was recommended by this committee to the administration for Africa. They recommended that they cut a quarter of a billion dollars out to knock the number back to \$750 million for the entire content of Africa.

I hope in some discussions, although you are not a legislator and don't set policy, if a word could be whispered, if the Secretary of State could see fit to recommend restoration of the \$250 million

¹ The CIA could not find further information on this matter.

that have been cut out of the Africa budget that has been recommended.

HAITI

My question shifts quickly to Haiti. Our State Department indicated that they have no knowledge of civil rights violations to repatriated Haitians. I returned from Haiti several days ago and met with the legislators there, not the illegal governments.

My question is, if the State Department is correct, we have no knowledge of any kind of infractions of human rights for returning Haitians. It is right because we have no system. When we asked how do you know we have about 40 people at our embassy, spokespersons in Haiti who live around the countryside, and we ask them to keep their eyes open and let us know if they see something. So, the State Department can say we have no knowledge because there is no system.

Has your agency done any kind of intelligence to either affirm or not about what is happening to repatriated Haitians? Of course, my position is that they should be given a 6-month stay until that situation is stabilized, but what do you know about Haiti and what is going on for these people being forcibly repatriated, about 6,000 to date?

Mr. GATES. I won't pretend that we have what I would call thorough coverage of Haiti, but I will say that the limited information that I have seen has suggested that the authorities there have taken some steps to try to prevent abuses of the people who are being repatriated.

Apart from that, we don't have much in the way of independent intelligence information.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mrs. Meyers?

OVERPOPULATION

Mrs. MEYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your excellent, comprehensive statement. I am very pleased that you are from Kansas. I was also very pleased to see your statement about population. Some see overpopulation only as a woman's problem, which was the basis for Henry Hyde's statement about our being the "gynecologist of the world." I am interested in overpopulation as a woman's problem, but, of course, overpopulation is a great deal more than that.

It is a human issue, overpopulation causes misery, sickness as in cholera, hunger, problems of the environment as in global warming, conflict, sometimes even war. I am very pleased that you chose to address this problem.

I would agree with Mr. Hyde in his statement about the importance of the Intelligence Community and the importance of supporting that Intelligence Community.

A couple of quick questions.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING ON TERRORIST GROUPS

In general terms, how effective is cooperation with friendly countries in sharing intelligence on terrorist groups?

Mr. GATES. I would say that overall, the cooperation is quite good. In fact, I think that one of the great unsung intelligence successes during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the period subsequently has been the relative absence of terrorist attacks that were expected before the war broke out.

A lot of this is due to intelligence work, and I would say to cooperation among a number of nations in terms of taking actions that would help prevent specific terrorist acts to make circumstances difficult for terrorist organizations to operate in there at this time.

I think this is one area where over the last 6 or 7 years there has been an extraordinary development of cooperation across national boundaries with, I think, very productive results.

SCIENTISTS EMIGRATING

Mrs. MEYERS. Thank you.

Now shifting to the Soviet Union, or has the CIA made it a priority to track the movements of those Soviet scientists with nuclear weapons expertise so that we would be aware of any emigration to the countries that we would be concerned about in terms of nuclear proliferation?

Mr. GATES. Without getting into the specifics of some of our activities, I would say that we are working very hard to cooperate with the State Department in the efforts that they have underway to monitor that kind of activity, and to come up with, in cooperation with the authorities of the republics, to come up with alternatives that would prevent that kind of emigration.

POST SADDAM REGIME

Mrs. MEYERS. Moving to Iraq, if you can speculate on this—what sort of post-Saddam regime do you expect there to be? Do we have any idea about the strengths of emerging groups in Iraq?

Mr. GATES. I think that the likelihood is that if Saddam were to be removed, it would be an action taken by the Army, and he would likely be replaced—well, it is hard to say.

I suppose that on balance, he is more likely than not to be replaced by another military figure or strong man-type. The important thing is that any successor to Saddam, whatever his views, is going to be substantially weaker than Saddam.

He has had 20 years to build a structure of oppression that he personally manages and the Iraqi people have had 20 years to become accustomed to his terror apparatus. Any new leader in the first instance, if he wanted to get Iraq back on the path to recovery from the war, would have to take a series of actions that would lead to the lifting of the sanctions.

So that, in itself would be a deterrent in terms of severe actions, but my suspicion is, without being an expert on Iraq, that what you would see would be probably a succession of governments. We would hope that it would move in the direction over time of a much greater democracy and giving the people of Iraq a chance to have a say in their future.

NON-SLAVIC REPUBLICS OF FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mrs. MEYERS. How effective has the intelligence community been in recruiting experts on the non-Slavic republics of the CIS?

Mr. GATES. We, received information about the fact that the non-Slavic republics were surprised to receive their freedom so quickly. They had expected a several-year transition period.

We agreed wholeheartedly with their assessment. We are not exactly running over with people who can speak some of the languages of Central Asia.

We have some capability, but we are going to have to put a much higher priority on some of the languages just so we can read some of the press now that it is free.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Orton.

SALE OF URANIUM TO FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

Mr. ORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for missing most of this hearing. I am on another committee and was listening to Mr. Brady report on the RTC.

Mr. Gates, thank you for coming. I have just a couple of questions.

According to a recent article in Defense News, several republics of the former Soviet Union are considering the sale of uranium to offset their deficits.

Could you provide us with an update on the possible sale of uranium to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia?

Mr. GATES. I don't think we have anything on that, Mr. Orton. We will look into it. If we do, we will get back to you.²

YELTSIN GOVERNMENT

Mr. ORTON. On February 10, Radio Free Europe issued a report containing two statements that I found of particular interest on Boris Yeltsin.

I would like to read the statements and get your reaction. It says, "Yeltsin's own colleagues are concerned that in order to survive politically, Yeltsin may soon decide to replace the present reformist government Russian Vice President Rotskoi and also Yeltsin's recent proposal to create a new Super Ministry for Security suggests that he is prepared to move to a more authoritarian rule and sacrifice some of the previous achievements of democratization."

Do you have a comment on those two statements?

Mr. GATES. There is difficulty inside the current Russian Government, differences of view and so on, and there has been speculation that Yeltsin might change some of the leading personalities in the government.

That said, I don't know very many analysts who believe he would replace the current head of government with Rotskoi. Rotskoi is pursuing a political agenda that is contrary to Yeltsin's, and Yeltsin's regard for him, I think, was illustrated by the fact that he put

² The information was provided separately since it was at the classified level.

him in charge of fixing the agricultural problem which is not career-enhancing, I would say.

With respect to the second statement, I think that one of the most interesting aspects of Yeltsin's attempt to create the super Security Ministry was the fact that when he took the action and the legislature protested it and it went to the Russian equivalent of the Supreme Court, when the court ruled that Yeltsin could not take that action, perhaps for the first time at least in real terms in Russian history a leader backed away from an action he clearly wanted to do in order to try and enhance the rule of law, and I think it is really noteworthy that on an issue that is as central to the survival of that Government as the future of the different security services that on an issue of that consequence, Yeltsin was willing to accept the decision of the court and back off.

So I saw that whole episode in many respects as a reaffirmation of Yeltsin's commitment to democratic reform rather than his willingness to embrace authoritarian measures.

Mr. ORTON. Over the weekend, we witnessed several demonstrations regarding the military and return of Communist rule.

There are obviously a number of groups opposed to Yeltsin's rapid reforms. Do we have information to what degree these anti-reform groups may be tied together? Are they in cooperation?

Is there a cogent movement toward eliminating these reforms, and is the Agency discerning anything regarding these recent activities, protests and meetings, et cetera?

Mr. GATES. There clearly are contacts among these different groups. In fact, one of the people who is trying to bring them together in many respects is Rotskoi. The defense industrial complex, the military, some elements of the military, some former Communist firms, those who are hostile to some of the reforms, those who are hostile to Yeltsin—there are a lot of contacts among these people, the extreme nationalists, but the significant thing is that those demonstrations in Moscow only drew about 5,000 people. They were really quite small.

So while there is a growing concern and disenchantment with the reforms because of the pain being imposed on the people and the high prices involved, the encouraging thing is that there seems to be no jelling of an opposition that would jeopardize the reforms at this point.

SCIENTISTS EMIGRATING

Mr. ORTON. One final question and follow-up to Mrs. Meyers' question regarding scientists emigrating.

Can you confirm the reports that Iran and Libya have been attempting to recruit the scientists, and specifically nuclear scientists from the Soviet Union?

Mr. GATES. First of all, there have been Soviets in Libya helping with their reactor, which has been around for a decade, for about 10 years, but this is a long-standing program.

We get rumors fairly often about the Iranians and the Libyans and the Algerians and others trying to recruit Russians or people, former scientists of the former Soviet Union.

We have not been able to confirm any of those at this time independently.

Mr. ORTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Goss.

CAPABILITIES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Mr. Goss. Mr. Gates, thank you very much for an informative morning.

Notwithstanding your encouraging closing statements and your opening remarks some hours ago about too quickly disengaging, I think it would be fair to characterize the mood in the United States toward foreign assistance as somewhat ugly or certainly parsimonious, to use a euphemism. That leads us to a necessity to make some very wise and intelligent decisions in the Government, and that means good information and good intelligence.

I was very pleased by what you had to say in response to Mr. Johnson's question about human intelligence and the need to make sure that we have adequate capabilities in that area as well as our technical capabilities, because it is obvious we have more targets of a different type than we have ever had before.

Having said that, can you assure me that we are going to have across the board capability in our intelligence community to do the job we need to do, and I would specifically include covert action on a global basis in that question?

Mr. GATES. I think that that is a decision that essentially has to be made by the President and by the Congress. One of the purposes of the National Security Review No. 29, which required some 20 departments and agencies—the heads of those departments and agencies to identify at presidential direction what their intelligence requirements would be to the year 2005, was precisely to get some idea of what the policymakers viewed would be their information needs from us over the next decade to decade and a half in essence, so that we wouldn't be validating our own mission, but would be having that validated by the users of our information.

When I get that information from the National Security Council, I am supposed to put together some alternative budget proposals. I think it is worth noting that in the proposals that Secretary Cheney gave to the President, and the President made decisions on for some \$50 billion in defense, additional defense reductions over the next several years, there was no—out of that particular proposal, they basically shielded intelligence, clearly reflecting the priority that the President and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State attached to having strong intelligence capability, particularly at a time when we are cutting back defense significantly.

So clearly the dialog now will shift to the Congress and there I would hope to make the same point, that we are going to be making a lot of changes, changing the structure of the intelligence community in some important cause. We are changing our priorities. We have been for some time, and we will do more so in the future, but at the same time that the country is going to significantly cut back its defense capabilities, I would hope that they

would proceed with some care in weakening the early warning system.

Mr. Goss. I think that is an encouraging answer, but I am not sure I have digested it yet. You, as DCI, have, I think, a voice in that debate. I wanted to make sure that as DCI, you have an open mind as to the full range of capabilities for our intelligence community.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. GATES. Absolutely.

CUBA

Mr. Goss. We touched lightly on Cuba. You left us with sort of a tantalizing nonconclusion that things are bad, that we are looking for brutality, dot, dot, dot.

Do you have any projection to make as to dot, dot, dot, what that might mean, or if not, can you assure us that we in the United States, particularly in south Florida, are relatively safe from misadventures by an increasingly brutal and desperate Castro?

Mr. GATES. I think the economic and political and social circumstances in Cuba, the disappearance of Castro's primary patron, the Soviet Union, all would suggest that the days of Castro and his regime are numbered.

My only problem is I don't know what the number is, but I think that the general view is that this is a regime that is at least looking at its final period in power.

Nobody knows, including Castro, what that period is going to look like or how long it will take.

As the regime continues to decline, and as Castro sees his power and his longevity, I think, in jeopardy, there is a risk that he will turn to measures to try and create new challenges and problems for the United States.

We are not seeing that at this point, but it is something that we will be watching very carefully.

Mr. Goss. When you made your comment about countries with a capability to cause missiles to land on the continental United States, you mentioned China and the former Soviet Union. You did not mention Cuba.

I guess they do have some capabilities to inflict some damage, and I hope you can assure us that you are monitoring those carefully.

Mr. GATES. We are monitoring it. I don't think they have any missiles that could reach the United States. They do have aircraft that could reach the United States.

A growing number of those aircraft are grounded for a lack of fuel and a good number of those that reach the United States seem to be carrying defectors.

Mr. Goss. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been an extensive period of questioning and thank you for your patience.

Not long ago, we met with Oleg Kalugin on the MIA situation and he was senior official in the KGB.

I asked him besides the MIA and POW questions, what the face of the new KGB looked like. He said you should bear in mind that while resources have been reduced, the old bureaucrats are still in place and the old KGB is still up to its old tricks.

What are your thoughts about where the KGB now stands, Mr. Gates?

Mr. GATES. I think that the current name of it is the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. It changes frequently. The fellow in charge of it, Mr. Primakov, in my opinion, is an old thinker of long standing. He clearly did not play a constructive role in the period when we were dealing with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and he has a long history in the old regime, particularly in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Our information is that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service first priority is still the United States, and that their first priority in that context is still the acquisition of technology and high-technology equipment.

I think that Judge Sessions would testify that in contrast to the East European states, we have seen relatively little change in the Russian intelligence services operations in the United States, and so it is a case where there seems to be a strong sense of reform from the political level of the Russian Government, Yeltsin and so on, and an interest on the part of this intelligence service in doing some things differently, but I think we should proceed with some care as we go along.

I am not prepared to say we won't have some contact with them and perhaps there are some areas such as nonproliferation where we might be able to do something useful working together, but I think we should proceed with great caution.

ANTI-SEMITISM IN FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mr. GILMAN. I appreciate your analysis. In the former Soviet Republic, a rise of ultranationalist groups coupled with severe economic hardships have aggravated concerns about a resurgence of anti-Semitism, possibly with violent overtones.

How do you assess the threat to the Jewish community in the Russian republic and other republics, and what about six from now, especially if economic conditions worsen?

Mr. GATES. I know that there are a number of people who are concerned about this. I think that the person that we have seen so far from people living there, Israelis and others, is prospective so far, that I have not seen evidence of a significant growth of anti-Semitism or taking revenge, if you will, on Jews in the former Soviet Union.

It is something we will be watching. It is something that a lot of people worry about. It has certainly been one of the components contributing to a desire to emigrate from those republics.

So we don't have much on it now. It is something we will certainly watch.

Mr. GILMAN. I noted in one of the recent demonstrations in the Kremlin there were posters and signs that had anti-Semitic slo-

gans. Pomyat is still very active and these things are of great concern to the Jewish community.

Mr. GATES. The fact of the matter is that there is an ugly history of this in Russian history and in some of the republics so it is something that bears watching.

Mr. GATES. I appreciate your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.

We appreciate your testimony and your response to the questions.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]